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Introduction
The restriction of workers' rights and capacities to organise formal struggles over wages and
conditions is an issue around which authoritarian governments in developing industrial capitalist
states have coalesced and once such rights have been conceded, the ruling elites lose coherence.
In South Africa, the traditional support for the National Party among white wage earners came
seriously into question after the 1979-81 reforms of industrial relations, precipitating the defection
to the Conservative Party of many working-class Afrikaners after 1982. The purpose of this paper
is to account for the Wiehahn Commission and the industrial relations reforms which followed it
and also to attempt briefly to define a research agenda which places South Africa in an international
historical perspective. Can a similar stage in the demise of authoritarian regimes in industrialising
societies, which have subsequently given way to bourgeois democratic forms of government, be
identified?
Are there Precedents?
This paper seeks to suggest the potential for comparisons of a specific point in the transition from
authoritarianism to democracy: the point at which a regime begins to reform itself significantly. The
phase which follows can be termed liberalisation, originally designed to stabilise the regime and
reassert control over society but unintentionally providing leeway for the intensification of popular
opposition. A common feature of such liberalisation is the recognition of formerly illegal or
unrecognised workers organisations. In this respect, one trend has been to compare South Africa
with Brazil, Argentina and Chile - all have undergone a process of import substitution
industrialisation in the twentieth century which has forced the state to come to terms with a working
class movement3 Into this list could also be brought Venezuela which experienced dictatorship
from 1948 to 1958.3 Venezuela's oil wealth facilitated industrial protection and promotion as did
mineral wealth in South Africa. •
These examples do present an obvious and considerable problem of comparison - in the
post-war period there has been cyclical change in the form of government in Latin America, so the
comparative historian has to account for the breakdown of democracy at various points as well as
the demise of military dictatorships.4 Venezuela has had a democratic government since 1958. Thus
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although in terms of economic structure South Africa shows greater similarities to South America
than to the rest of Africa, let alone Europe, South Africa's has been a relatively stable
authoritarianism. The alliance between the state and white labour was more enduring than any
alliances with elements within the working class constructed by the authoritarian projects of Latin
America.
Comparing South Africa with the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships might yield insights
as to whether entrenched authoritarian regimes of the post-war period were 'softened-up' for
democratic transition by demands for collective bargaining rights to be extended to all. Both
countries underwent a major wave of urbanisation and secondary industrialisation from the mid
1950s. From the late 1950s, Iberian authoritarianism suffered a decline in legitimacy as younger
technocrats entering the authoritarian coalitions argued for the need to liberalise.5 By 1975 Spain
was the only remaining authoritarian regime in capitalist Europe, just as by 1980 South
Africa/Namibia was the only colonial style regime left in Southern Africa.
In 1945 the Spanish state was organised along strictly authoritarian lines. It was a military
dictatorship relying on support from the Catholic church, business community, peasant smallholders,
and the urban middle classes who constituted the bulk of Fascist (Falange) party members. Labour
unions were suppressed and attempts at clandestine organisation harshly punished.9 A labour
relations bureaucracy was created in the early years of the regime, designed to promote the idea
that authoritarian Nationalism was an advance on liberal democracy, supplanting class conflict. It
was an instrument in the service of the state and under its direction. Its local officials were
invariably Falangists appointed from above.7
By the second half of 1950s, Spain was heading decisively in the direction of an open
. economy integrated into international markets. Peasants and agricultural labourers became industrial
or construction workers. Capital, commodities and people were flowing into Spain - the ability of
the state to stand guard over the country and control the fate of the population came to an end.6
Economic change was accompanied by institutional changes of enormous importance for
the system of industrial relations. These had to do with collective bargaining, strikes and workers'
associations. Driven by economic development of the 1960s and based on the Ley de Convenios
Colectivos of 1958, collective bargaining spread throughout industry, generating the need for some
recognition of workers' representatives with whom to negotiate. The Ley de Jurados de Empresa
granted some measure of freedom for the election of workers' representatives within companies.
Unrepresentative delegates would hinder compliance with agreements and hamper productivity.
Clandestine organisations, the Comisiones Obreras, which operated both within and outside the
reformed official structures were ensured a margin of tolerance on the part of the authorities. The
1960s saw an increasing gap between the autonomous shop-floor representation accepted by
employers and the official negotiating structures which were deemed by both parties to be heavy
handed and inefficient. The shop-steward based Comisiones Obreras forged a national organisation.
After a strike wave in 1962, the definition of strikes as acts of sedition was dropped - and
'economic' as distinct from 'political' strikes were legalised. From 1962 onwards factory committees
were an independent trade union movement in embryo, infiltrating official jurados de empresa but
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not co-opted by them.8 As one leader put it,
When wide sectors of the working-class movement participate in union elections
and defend the idea of using the premises and material means of the official union,
we do so not because we accept its structures, its principles or its hierarchies. We
do so to facilitate the exercise of workers democracy...The use of legality in this
area demands, in fact, the exercise of trade-union rights and simultaneously
negates the validity of the official scheme.10
In 1968 however, the Supreme Court defined Comisiones Obreras as illegal and subversive
organisations and repression against working class organisations intensified. As quasi-public
operations they were vulnerable to repression - the whole national executive arrested in 1972 and
given prison sentences ranging from six to twenty years. The regime response was a double strategy
of integration and repression. The Ley Sindical of 1971 extended representation of workers at lower
levels and granted greater independence of workers and managers within the official trade unions -
the idea was to turn the workers own organisations into instruments of the state. This failed as strike
action escalated. Days lost through strike action rose from 250,000 per year in 1964-9 to about
850,000 in 1970-72 and 1.5 million 1973-5. The working class contributed to the erosion of the
legitimacy of the Franco regime although they never seriously represented a direct challenge to
it.11 At the time of democratic transition then, the unions had accumulated ten or more years
experience of massive strikes, collective bargaining and representative unions.
The regime of Marcello Caetano in Portugal from 1966 continued the corporate
authoritarianism of his deceased predecessor Salazar with a strategy of modernisation and
revitalisation of the corporate ideal.12 Labour relations reform was central to this. In June 1969
the official sindicatos (labour unions) were given the right to select their own leadership without
government approval. Arbitration commissions were restructured, no longer giving automatic
support for austerity and wage controls. Soon the sindicatos began to be transformed into genuine
instruments of the workers. Elections of oppositionists within the unions were not annulled. Strikes,
slowdowns and protest demonstrations increased with government acquiescence. Accelerating
industrialisation created a 'real labouring class in urban centres as distinct from deferential servant
elements upon which Portuguese authoritarianism was predicated'.13 Large scale emigration from
Portugal caused severe labour shortages and weakening the employers' hand. In 1970 the most
politicised sindicato, the metalworkers, rejected the labour contract offered but the arbitration
commission and called a mass rally.
The government became nervous about the changes it had unleashed, banned the rally and
issued new decrees, one giving the government the right to suspend elected officials for activities
'contrary to social discipline'. Workers immediately began to reorganise into unsanctioned factory
committees. These clandestine non-government unions were organised into a broad umbrella
organisation called Intersindical. In 1971 Intersindical, with between 150,000 and 200,000 members,
sought recognition from the International Labour Organisation.
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The industrial relations reforms stimulated discontent among rightist elements which began to plot
overthrow of the regime. Thus.the decision to liberalise industrial relations quickly led to a
profound crisis for the Portuguese regime.
The basic theme to be extended to the South African example is that economic
development in an autocracy produces social and political contradictions which foster organised
movements of dissent among the social groups empowered by that development. The attempting to
control such movements through reforms from above provides further tools for mobilisation,
pressure and action and precipitates major divisions within autocratic coalitions.
The Demise of the Racially Exclusive Industrial Relations Apparatus in South Africa
The destabilisation of the racially exclusive industrial relations system of South Africa occurred
through challenges to the exclusionary tactics of registered trade unions, these challenges were
presented by emerging unrest and resistance amongst the mass of low paid black workers in
manufacturing industry, and by the broader processes of economic and social change presenting a
challenge to the apartheid system.
South Africa's manufacturing sector had been structured by a variety of forms of state
intervention designed to extend the employment of black workers whilst maintaining their political
and economic marginalisation. In textiles and clothing, the decentralisation of firms to border areas
and homelands beyond the jurisdiction of industrial councils exerted constant downward pressure
on wages in a limited and competitive domestic market. The resistance to black wage demands was
also clearly manifested in the engineering industries, which were struggling to achieve returns on
heavy capital investment in the context of limited consumer demand, especially for cars. Industry
was not standing completely still on issues of African advancement: personnel consultants' advice
on how 'to close the wage gap' was sought, especially by international companies, in the face of an
extremely racialised labour market demonstrated in the table overleaf.
Any tentative pressures by capitalists towards deracialisation of the labour market had been
stifled in the 1960s, creating stresses and strains within the social relations of production which
started to burst through the shackles of repression in the early 1970s. Before moving specifically to
consider industrial relations, there follows a brief analysis of broader apartheid policies in the 1970s
identifying the factors galvanising reformists within the Nationalist Party (NP).
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Apartheid: Contested Elements of Policy Reform Emerge.
The earliest evidence that a process of restructuring of state policies was under consideration in the
NP came with the appointment of a Commission to rethink the status of 'the Coloured community'
within apartheid as a whole. Ian Goldin, in his specialist study of Coloured identity, argues that the
Theron Commission was appointed in 1973 through pressure exerted by Cape Nationalists who saw
the need for more action to supplement the rhetoric of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy
(CLPP) after the elimination of the last vestiges of common political rights.14
The Commission's call for a new constitutional dispensation was accepted by the Cabinet
in 1977, before the accession of P.W. Botha. Coloured participation in countrywide resistance and
stay-aways triggered by the Soweto massacres of June 1976 undermined a dearly held stereotype of
the political docility of Coloured workers, and provided ammunition for the reformist elements
within the Cape NP to join with organised capital and argue for far more sophisticated models of
co-option,15 Attempts to privilege Coloured workers over Africans in the Western Cape labour
market were intensified as Theron resolutely defended the CLPP and the maintenance of a full scale
influx control operation in the Western Cape.
Intense lobbying activity by the Federated Chamber of Industries produced another minor
deviation from separate development policy - the appointment in 1973 of an Interdepartmental
Committee to consider Training of Bantu in Industrial Areas'. The Chairman, Mr van Zyl, was at
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pains Co stress the limits to be placed on such training." Even this grudging reformist initiative was
frustrated by Verwoerdians at die Department of Bantu Administration and Development (DBAD).
When the Vaal Triangle Administration Board sought to clarify the possibilities for industrial
training an official in the Bantu Education section told them that the intention was...
to give the Bantu a basic training so that he is more industry oriented. He will
then know what a chisel is, what a hammer is etc, if asked to pass it.17
A similar stalemate affected the whole township and influx control machinery. The Bantu Affairs
Administration Boards (BAABs) were operating in the context of further advance in rural
proletarianisation, the terminal decline in reserve production and housing relocation to the
bantustans.18 BAAB officials had to face problems created by decades of housing neglect and a
massive housing shortage but the Minister at the DBAD, M.C. Botha, author of many of the
measures designed to step up the influx control offensive during the 1960s, was hostile to reformist
initiatives.
Indications that Administration Boards were beginning to facilitate social reproduction in
urban areas comes from evidence from Vereeniging. Family housing was being granted to men with
less than ten years service, influx control exemptions granted, mobility of workers between plants
facilitated, and infringements of Physical Planning Act ignored.19 These reforms were stepped up
after the short but catalytic stay at the DBAD of Andries Treurnicht and Ferdi Hartzenberg, the
Ministers provoked Soweto uprising and proved starkly to the NP that it needed allies among the
business community and among sections of the black community. One of the most important
consequences of the unrest in factories and the African townships of the early 1970s was the
reassertion in government policy making circles of pressures for reforms in the legal status and
economic positions of urban Africans.20
A further heavy dose of repression was also prescribed. In response to the massacre of
protesting school students in Soweto, millions of black workers had joined community based political
stay-aways. The fledgling unions described below avoided any role in these events, but the
government responded to the uprising by seeking to repress any visible form of black political
organisation outside its own narrow collaborative projects. In November 1976, 26 individuals
associated with the emergent unions were placed under five year banning orders.
The Vorster government was, by late 1976, exhibiting unprecedented strategic
indecisiveness.:i The impressive economic indicators which had emboldened the regime in the
1960s had evaporated, with inflationary pressures an increasing source of social disaffection across
the divided working class. Whereas the consumer price index had increased less than 4% per annum
in 1960s, between 1969 and 1976 this rate was 9.1%. The cost of food and transportation led the
push.22 This inflationary pattern, a common experience in the capitalist world suggests the degree
to which South Africa's economy had become integrated into the international economy. Powerful
business lobbies were, in such circumstances, able to wring tentative concessions from the
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government, which lurched from reform to extreme repression in its at tempt to save the apartheid
project from its own contradictions. The next section considers how employers in manufacturing
industry responded to the direct pressure of workers ' demands within their own sphere of authority.
The Employers ' Response to the Durban Strikes
The seismic effect upon apartheid rule of the 1973 Durban strikes is widely acknowledged, but the
strikes are commonly presented as an unexpected jolt to a stable, efficiently functioning capital-state
repressive apparatus. Here the Durban strikes are viewed as par t of a chain of events related to the
contradictions of apartheid project: the attempt to impose a rigid racially hierarchical labour market
in a rapidly industrialising economy.
The Natal Chamber of Industries (NCI) launched a major investigation into the causes of
the strikes which swept through the province in January and February 1973.23 The Minister of
Labour had, from the outset, blamed the labour unrest on three factors. These were low wages,
failure of employers t o establish proper channels of communication, and, of course, agitators, chiefly
NUSAS and the Student Wages Commission at the University of Natal, Durban. In the NCI 's repor t
this at tempt by the government to disown responsibility for the strikes was met with angry rebuttal
by its Director.
The Minister is either completely out of touch or thankful to find excuses whereby
attention was directed away from the real underlying causes of unrest, which
beyond all doubt was primarily attributable to the government 's own policy. The
attitude of Minister of Transport is absolutely deplorable. The Chamber drew his
attention to the fact that the increase in passenger fares to the resettlement areas
was a serious factor and pleaded that rail fares be restored to pre-January 1973
levels. H e responded that if employers were to pay their Bantu workers a living
wage, the latter would have no difficulty in paying the increased fares.
Because of the limitations placed upon wage bargaining, t ransport has historically been a
focal point for worker resistance to the rising cost of living accompanying the process of capitalist
industrialisation in South Africa. The Alexandra bus boycotts of 1940, 1944 and 1957 and the
Durban strikes clearly demonstrate this. Less than a year after the Durban strikes, workers at
Newcastle boycotted the bus service run by the Trans-Tugela Transport Company which was
sponsored by the Bantu Investment Corporation. Militancy in areas of decentralised industry flared
up as it h a d done in Natal between 1958 and 1961 . " Bus services between Newcastle and the
African townships of Madadeni and Osizweni were run by the BIC. Large numbers of workers at
ISCOR, Veka Clothing, Bester Homes, Durban Falkirk and other large concerns were t ransported
to and from work by this bus company, which decided to increase fares from 18 to 30 cents. During
the bus boycott violence developed; vehicles were stoned, two bottlestores looted, and beerhalls
were wrecked. Two men were killed and several others injured when the police opened fire on the
crowd. Four white officials were held hostage in a compound by the workers and three policemen
were seriously in ju red . 3
Referring again to the 1973 strikes, Thomas reported that all employers were caught
completely unaware and unprepared by the strike, although virtually all employers were conscious
of the fact that in relation to the rising cost of living, African wages were 'seriously below a
reasonable level and in need of adjustment'. T he reason that employers had not spontaneously
granted increases prior to the strikes was that negotiation in regard to wages and other conditions
83
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of employment for 'a very big cross section of industry* were not determined at individual employer
level but at industrial council and Wage Board level. In a highly competitive private enterprise
system, argued Thomas, individual employers were not free to grant wages which were out of
keeping with those granted by their competitors. This line was the NCI's stock-in-trade of resistance
to African wage demands over the next five years.
Chamber members reported that the striking workers by-passed their works committees,
both official Works Committees established in terms of the Native Labour Act of 1953 and
unofficial works committees established outside the framework of the Act. As a result, employers
were prepared immediately to take the highly irregular step of negotiating directly with their
workers, which created an impression that strike action did pay. The NCI's internal report barely
stopped short of concluding that the strikes were justified.
Why should the Bantu, when they realised that as a mass they can exert
themselves, stop to think that they might achieve better results by using the
regional Bantu labour committees, composed of pro-government traders, teachers
and ministers of religion, who had been of little benefit to them in the past; or by
using the Works Committees elected by them under the Act which had no defined
function other than to nominate a liaison officer or by using the Committees of
Indunas and Boss Boys which some employers had given them.**
The chambers of industry and commerce were at full stretch from February 1973 onwards
to bring the strike situation under control by co-ordinating the responses of employers and thereby
wresting back the initiative from the workers. Lodge attributes the success of the Durban strikers
in extracting wage increases to the fact the strikes followed a decade Of increased capital intensity.
Wages, he argues, would thereby have been less important a component of production costs than
previously and manufacturers would have been more receptive to pressure to increase wages."
Nevertheless, it will be argued, employers only granted increases with the greatest of reluctance.
Subsequent analysis has shown that manufacturing saw narrowing of racial average incomes
between 1970 and 1975, although the real value of the absolute wage gap was still increasing, from
R2665 in 1970 to R3257 in 1976. The sector saw the real value of the wage bill for blacks average
8% growth per annum over the period, compared to 5.3% in the white wage bill. On the basis of
these figures Nattrass claims that the expansion of the sector has been a force operating to reduce
racial income inequality in South Africa, not only through wage increases for those already
employed in it, but also as a result of the growing contribution of a relatively high wage sector to
total, employment.88 The possibility remains that the period 1970-75 was exceptional. Local labour
markets, it seems, were not nearly as 'overstocked' with black workers in 1973 as they were by 1976.
Capital intensity notwithstanding, the FCI was quick to stress the profound structural weaknesses
of South African manufacturing capitalism.
Only industry can decide what increased costs their products are able to bear.
Adjustments must take place without economic and social dislocation. Assuming
no productivity increases, higher wages increase the selling price. The resultant
reduction in demand will further increase unit prices, and the hard won process
of import replacement and wealth and employment generation could be set in
reverse. With inflation increasing, the level of living is constrained by balance of
payment considerations. 75% of economic growth has been due to capital
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investment and additional labour, and only 2 5 % due to increased
productiveness.28
A sharp clash of opinion over what t o do about black wages was repor ted from the Executive
Council of the FCI in May 1973. Speakers from the M C I urged rates to be raised above regional
Poverty Da tum Levels. Natal employers preached caution. M r R.C. Throssell warned that wage
increases could cause firms to ' tender themselves out of business', whilst his colleague M r R.V.
Preakes was concerned that wages could not be put up to Poverty Da tum Levels without 'depriving
shareholders' .3 0 Resistance to wage hikes was increasingly apparent in the private sector by 1976,
when the disciplinary potential of available unemployed labour was becoming increasingly apparent
to employers therein. In 1976 Mr B. McLeod of the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce poured his
heart out to the press in defence of low wages.
A living wage is fine for those who get it but not so good for those that lose their
jobs, and this is very relevant when one finds 1,000 or more African men standing
outside ones premises asking for jobs. Until there is a re-appraisal of attitudes by
government to enable the most productive use to be made of our labour through
education and training, poverty will persist and no quantity of wage board
determination, trade union organisation or exhortation to employers will succeed
in effecting any material change to the better.31 ' •
Whilst becoming increasingly vocal in criticism of government over training and labour preference,
firms were set against opening their doors to the independent trade unions which emerged from the
1973 strikes. Lipton argues that the 1977 Commission of Enquiry into Labour Legislation, the
Wiehahn Commission, opened the door to registration of unions without regard to race because of
a decade of pressure from 'blacks and from progressive capital'.33 This skims over the managerial
and registered t rade union resistance to the emerging unions between 1973 and 1980, which is
analysed in detailed accounts by Friedman and Webster.3 3 In generalising with the term
'progressive capital', Lipton would certainly have had to overlook the comments of Mr Gordon
Rennie, owner of the multi-million Rand Rennie's Consolidated Holdings.
Democrat ic processes didn't work in government or industry. 'I don' t believe it
works and I can't put up with i f ...'It doesn't make any sense to m e for any
country to be run by the lowest common denominator. The only hope for the
Western world is to get back to a system of qualified franchise so that each
country is run by its best people' . Basic change in South Africa's internal policies
was discounted. Asked what time limit he set for such changes he said 'Never'.34
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Employers and the Independent Unions, 1973-77
The 1953 Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Ac t was in 1973 superseded by the Bantu Labour
Relations Regulation A c t This was designed to destroy any momentum towards trade unionism
generated by the Durban strikes by giving statutory recognition to works and liaison committees for
Africans at shopfloor level. Marais Viljoen set out the thinking behind the measure:
I wish to state quite categorically that the government will not consider the
recognition of Bantu trade unions or their organisation or affiliation in a way
which is tantamount to recognition.35
The problem for the government was that the works committees, which could be constituted
without the direct participation of management, served as proto-unions, providing a basis for co-
ordination between factories. Powerful pressure was applied by the government to industrialists
during the course of 1974 not to recognise black trade unions and to sack black workers w h o struck
illegally. The fire of Afrikaner Nationalist passion was stoked by the British Labour government's
investigation into British firms operating in South Africa. The Department of Labour, the Bureau
of State Security and the Security Police targeted British firms for hard line pressure. Viljoen told
an election meeting in Natal that 'some people' wanted to foist on South Africa a British trade
union system which 'plunged Britain into the worst crisis of the last quarter century1 on to black
workers, with their 'totally different background and temperament'. H e warned employers not to
by-pass existing legislation.38
Motor car companies, as high prestige, 'high visibility', international operators, were the
most vulnerable of manufacturing industries to demands for reform of racist shop floor practices
and wage dispensations. Nevertheless, reform was slow in coming because management in the motor
industry clearly did not perceive themselves to be in a position of economic strength. The motor
industry had already faltered badly in 1971. Phase Three of the local content programme, to raise
local content to 65% by 1976, required hefty capital investment. A simultaneous fall in car sales was
blamed on an anti-inflationary credit squeeze which hit all producers in 1971. Layoffs and short
working were announced first by Ford and GM, 3 7 then by LEYKOR, 3 8 Chrysler,38 and VW. 4 0
R.G. du Plessis, spokesman of Motor Industry Employers, argued that demand for new cars in
South Africa had bit a ceiling which could not be raised significantly until the earnings of the 'non-
whites' were raised. Volkswagen's Mr G. Eckert predicted that the industry had moved into long
term recession and decline.111
The component manufacturers were particularly hard ML The Board of Anglo-Vaal, the
holding company of James Brown and Hamer, decided to close down the firm's R l million
production foundry in Durban. The reason cited was the lack of a sufficiently large market for car
components to make an automated foundry an economic proposition. The shortage of local skilled
men familiar with automated operations in the field of motor component manufacture had also been
a factor contributing to high prices. When Phase Three was put into operation there had been
strong resistance to local products, as representatives of the motor industry felt that they should be
39
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able to buy local components at the same price as those from overseas.49 There were simply too
many manufacturers in the small market. Total vehicle sales in 1976-7 were 300,248, 'shared'
between 12 manufacturers and 41 models. The industry showed losses throughout the 1970s but
companies held on because, with a massive total of R300,000,000 locked in fixed assets, they were
reluctant to write off the capital they had invested.43
Among the multinational car companies coming under international scrutiny, it was British
Leyland which set the anti-union ball rolling. Dr Francois Jacobsz, finance and planning director,
declared that he would not hear of African unions. The policy was to negotiate with labour and
resolve disputes within the scope of the available legal machinery despite the consistent boycott of
these structures. Leyland had raised wages above the Poverty Datum Line, so when the ungrateful
Metal and Allied Workers Union staged a recognition strike, 220 were fired.44 It was reported in
early 1974 that Managing Directors in the Durban motor industry had begun to ring
January/February with a red pencil, to denote 'strike season'. The cost of outright aggression in the
face of workers' demands could be adverse publicity, ongoing disruptions, strikes, dismissals and
lost production, but most firms targeted by the unions discovered a considerable respect for the
apartheid trade union laws.40
The reform of industrial relations
Once the National Party had been a white people's party whose policies were
made by the rank and file at party congresses. Now they were devised by an elite
and presented to party members for rubber stamping with a maximum of patriotic
rhetoric and a minimum of detai l The government reformed by stealth and its
policies were not what it thought necessary but what it could get away with.
Ministers needed wide powers to grant exemptions from the law. Scrapping or
changing racial laws needed approval from the caucus and party - exemptions, did
not. P.W. Botha could dismantle much of job reservation without touching the law
which had created it.46
The process of government under Botha's Presidential system is described to great effect by
Friedman, but the NP was never the people's party with internal democracy as he describes it. Its
authoritarian structures had been used many times to silence internal critics. White labour interests
were not immune from such gagging as the following examples demonstrate.
To back the notion that industries in 'white' areas should be staffed overwhelmingly by
whites, whilst at the same time wishing to remain abreast of the most modern production processes
in industry, the N P advised urban manufacturers to mechanise and thereby reduce their dependence
on unskilled black labour. Simultaneously however the availability of black labour in government
designated border areas favoured production of consumer goods at lower cost than in areas of
established industry, drained business commitment in the latter areas to white labour. In 1958 and
1959 the N P chose to subsidise white labour to persuade Germiston clothing employers to keep
their factories open whilst continuing to facilitate the decentralisation of the industry.
The reaction of government supporting garment workers in Germiston to the soft-pedalling
of job reservation was one of outrage. Protest meetings were convened by the Member of
Parliament for Germiston, Mr J. du Pisanie. D u Pisanie was a genuine champion of the white
women garment workers whose livelihood was threatened by the government's encouragement of
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border areas industrialisation. In April 1959 he circulated the NP caucus in Cape Town with figures
provided by the Industrial Council which showed how white jobs had been threatened, and disputing
the government's unemployment statistics. During the first half of 1959 unemployed clothing workers
were not being absorbed into other fields and fell back on state benefits. Since 1954 white
employment had declined from 2413 to 1565, whereas employment in the 'uncontrolled areas' had
leapt another 1300 since 1956 to around 3.000.4' News of du Pisanie's actions was leaked by the
Industrial Council Chairman Jimmy Thomas to the Sunday Times reporter Charles Bloomberg: splits
in NP ranks were always headlines in the English press.
Under strong pressure to keep quiet from the NP whips, du Pisanie brought the matter up
in Parliament under the Labour .Vote the next day. The day after a report appeared in the press
that 'Dr Verwoerd regretted that Mr du Pisanie would not be available for re-election due to ill-
health'. The NP branch committees in Germiston were ordered not to nominate du Pisanie again.
Here the NP leadership was aiming to contain grassroots dissent, and hammering its main
spokesman was their first move. Then, at a public meeting in Germiston City Hall attended by
between 2,000 and 3,000 people, Minister of Labour Jan de Klerk announced subsidies to selected
factories to help them to keep whites on their books. It is a measure of the confidence of the NP
elite that de Klerk felt able to tell his audience, 'whether you like it or not, the NP policy is to
establish industries on the borders of native reserves.'43
The failure of job reservation, in the engineering industry as in the clothing industry, to
prevent operative categories from 'going black' struck fear bto the hearts of its most ardent
adherents: white operatives and supervisors in ISTA and the Mineworkers Union who dreaded the
advance black workers within the workplace. Mr 3 A. Kruger, Assistant General Secretary of ISTA,
insisted that 3,000 white men were looking for work in steel manufacturing. The Department of
Labour always denied reports of white unemployment, but Kruger argued that these men did not
report to the authorities. In the domestic appliance industry, 'natives had crept in and taken the
Europeans' legitimate work'/8
Again, as in the clothing industry, the political weakness of white worker advocates within
Afrikaner Nationalism was revealed as soon as they sought to speak out on what they perceived to
be government betrayal. The NP offered Afrikaner workers an authoritarian paternalism: workerist
noises were to be smothered under a mound of patronage. ISTA's duties as a government stooge
gave it little power to channel grievances upwards from the ranks, as Mr Kruger's revealing outburst
showed. In 1962 Kruger, who had held his post for 18 years, and R. Nagel, another veteran
organiser, announced the formation of a new metal workers' union. The two men were summarily
sacked from their ISTA positions in September 1961 after their candidature for the Conservative
Workers Party in Mayfair and Langlaagte, white working class constituencies in South Johannesburg,
in the post-Republic parliamentary election. Other officials were also expelled for vigorous protests
against their dismissal. Responding to the government accusation that the new union was political
Kruger told the press:
I can think of nothing more ironic than this baseless charge. After 18 years in
ISTA I can say with authority that there is no more politically dominated
organisation in the country.50
Members are incensed that now they have an opportunity of calling the
Government to account for policies which have hurt the workers, their trade union
47
 Natal Mercury, 27 Apr i l 1959, quot ing W a g e B o a r d figures.
46
 Rand Daily Mail, 25 Apri l 1959.
48
 Star, 3 M a y 1960.
60
 Sunday Times, 18 July 1962.
12
machinery is sot at their disposal and their representatives are disowned.91
Thus in dealing with the contradictions which arose between different aspects of apartheid
policy, the NP, even under Verwoerd, was quick to marginalised the white labour interest within
its ranks. Class differences within the Afrikaner community were, of course, suppressed in the
discourse of nationalism. Those insiders who did point out the gap between government rhetoric
and reality on white labour issues were silenced or expelled from their office. Despite the fact that
white labour was an essential constituency for the NP, its ruling elite, drawn exclusively from
professional ranks, maintained an authoritarian stance towards Afrikaner workers. The latter were
nevertheless generally enthusiastic at this time about a government which, in the areas of housing,
education, health and creating opportunities for advancement, allocated revenue disproportionately
to the white Afrikaner community to raise its living standards to those experience by English-
speaking white South Africans.
These authority structures proved useful again when pushing through into legislation the
measures recommended by the Wiehahn Report. The Commission upon which this report was based
was appointed by the Vorster Cabinet; I have not come across any account of exactly how the
composition of the Commission was decided. The pressures from organised business for the reform
of industrial relations came not on the issue of African trade union rights but upon job
reservation.63 It was widely assumed that whilst pushing for the deracialisation of skilled work,
Wiehahn's report would recommend a continuation of the attempt to destroy the independent
unions. Hemson argued that the Commission...
...presages the state's offensive against independent forms of organisation and the
further subordination among black workers to factory councils and registered trade
unions. The Commission may recommend activity of industrial trade unions be
highly restricted or eliminated altogether and something approximating to an
official company union be recognised as a collective bargaining unit."3
B.N. Mokoatle was the token African representative among the Commissioners."4 He was Chief
Professional Officer at UNISA Business School in charge of Small Business Development when
appointed to the Commission. The title of Lecturer was reserved for whites at UNISA. Mokoatle
did not have a mandate on the Commission to speak for the unregistered unions. Suspecting the
worst, they were not prepared to take part in giving evidence.
Mokoatle noted that the Commission had no guiding principles and had started its
deliberations by discussing 'more sophisticated versions of job reservation'. He acquainted himself
with black union activity and started threatening to resign if certain universal principles were not
recognised. Essentially he pressed for freedom of association without regard to race. After the first
report was released on this basis, 'black unions began to realise that something was happening'.
The Commission had turned into a remarkable showdown between 'labour protectionists'
and 'capitalists'. The token representatives of blacks in registered unions, CA. Botes (Coloured)
and G. Munsook (Indian), had some protectionist sentiments but sat in the progressive capitalist
camp with R.V. Sutton, TX Steenkamp, Wiehahn and Mokoatle himself.55 Dick Sutton of South
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African Breweries was part of the 'liberal personnel relations set-up' under Simon Biesheuvel.
Steenkamp, the President of the Chamber of Mines from General Mining and Finance Corporation,
was described by Mokoatle as a verligte Afrikaner who felt that management would be able to outwit
unions at sometime in the future. An investigation of industrial councils had been started by the
Industrial Tribunal shortly before the Wiehahn Commission in 1977. Mining executives preferred
a system in which disputes would be settled mine by mine rather than on a national basis. When
the Labour Relations Act was introduced bearing the Wiehahn reforms, Anglo-American
immediately pressed the Chamber of Mines to announce that they were in favour of the industrial
council system. This, it was thought, was the surest way to put blacks off the system as they
distrusted anything the Chamber of Mines said.98 The same idea of outwitting the unions fell flat
in the manufacturing sector. A Labour Relations Amendment Act was demanded from 1983
onwards by employers who felt that Wiehahn, in establishing an industrial court to consider union
claims of unfair labour practices, had conceded too much to clever union lawyers.
Errol Drummond, the SEIFSA reactionary, 'behaved like a Native Commissioner' but, along
with C.W.H. du Toit of the FCL 'wanted to be seen to be saying the right thing'. Although they had
working relationships with the verkrampte trade unionists going back to the war they wanted reforms
in training which meant opening up the system somewhat. Prof. PJ. van der Merwe, Professor of
Economics at Pretoria University and N J. Hechter, a Pretoria civil servant, took an indeterminate
'middling' position. Amongst the white trade unionists, A.I. Niewoudt, JA. Grobbelaar, CJP.
Grobler, and T.S. Neethling, Mokoatle was unable to perceive the subtle differences of position.
They acted as a pro-apartheid bloc, but really struggled to produce a case. They were worried about
the crippling economic effect of conceding trade union rights to blacks at ISCOR, SASOL and the
mines. On the basis of five reformists, four reactionaries, and four in between, the Commission was
able to establish the principle of 'freedom of association'. This was an historic concession, but entry
into industrial councils was still hedged with various administrative procedures designed to control
and neutralise the radicalism which the independent unions presaged. In legislation introduced in
1979 for example, migrant and 'foreign' workers were excluded from the definition of 'employee'.
Nevertheless, such exclusions soon proved impracticable and indefensible in relation to the broader
principles established by Wiehahn, and the Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1981 opened the
official collective bargaining system to all workers.
Affiliates of the Trade Union Council of South Africa, as a policy initiative, started
extending then- brand of trade unionism to African workers in 1979. The cry went up that TUCSA
had only become involved once organisation of African workers had become easy and respectable,
together with the more serious charge that TUCSA unions would accept the in-plant committee
system rather than push to open up the industrial councils system to the whole range of
representatives and interests. The parallel unions had not tried to negotiate dismissal procedures,
shop steward facilities and other in-plant issues. An example of their effect was the Transvaal
Clothing Agreement of February 1979 in which the African parallel union, the National Union of
Clothing Workers, 'took part* in negotiating a R13.75 minimum wage, lower than that specified in
the Wage Determination for unskilled labour (R17.20 for women) in manufacturing industry."7 At
Leyland, management requested Ronnie Webb of the Motor Industries Combined Workers Union
to organise black workers. Personnel officers were coercing workers into paying subs for the parallel
union, whilst the independent Metal and Allied Workers Union was consistently blocked.""
Thus companies facing recognition demands by emerging unions granted facilities to
TUCSA parallel unions which were denied their rivals, and personnel officers 'recruited' workers
for it. This offered government and employers a way of recognising African unions without
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conceding power.00 The strategy was, however, of short lived utility to employers after the full
implications of the Wiehahn reforms began to work themselves out. The TUCSA unions were
shocked to discover that they had outlived their usefulness to managements. When James North Ltd
were approached by the National Union of Textile Workers for recognition in 1983, the directors
no longer reached immediately for the telephone.
This union claims substantial membership in our plant and has alleged that our
employees have grown disenchanted with the apparent inefficiency and passivity
of the GWIU... As you are no doubt aware, we are 100% British owned by the
Siebe-Gorman group (Standard Bank - Anglican Church relationship) who are one
of the largest manufacturers of industrial safety equipment in the world. We are
therefore a conspicuous company in international terms and can ill afford to be
seen to be forcing an unrepresentative and unpopular union on our workers.
Additionally there is a distinct possibility that industrial unrest could cause
considerable disruption to our operation and spread to the rest of the clothing
industry if this matter is not resolved quickly and quietly in a meaningful manner.
Our management team had a meeting with the GWIU on Friday 23rd September
1983 where we explained the situation to them. The unions executive gave us the
verbal assurance that they would not press legal action against us if we were not
able to abide by the closed shop clause. I am requesting written confirmation that
JN will not be expelled from the Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association were
they to find themselves in a position, for reasons of industrial peace, that they are
compelled to develop a recognition agreement with the NUTW.80
An executive of the GWIU, commenting on this document for Arthur Grobbelaar, denied
consenting to the relaxation of the closed shop, writing in the margin of the memorandum, claiming,
This is a lie - we told them that we are prepared to go to the highest court'. There is no record of
them ever having done so.01
Whilst the TUCSA's leadership maintained a hostile policy towards FOSATU, its
relationship with an important affiliate, the Motor Industries Combined Workers Union had reached
crisis point. Its General Secretary, Des East, was forced to steer the union out of TUCSA, citing
the following points.
1) Increasing influence of conservative unions within TUCSA- the defeat of an
important political resolution by a card vote. [Failure to condemn death of Neil
Aggett].
2) Rightly or wrongly TUCSA is seen in a negative light by many Black [African]
workers - by association this Union is similarly perceived and this makes our
organising work immensely difficult in the face of opposition from non-TUCSA
unions.82
East perceived a 'sea change' in the attitude of young Coloured mechanics in 1976, feeding
through into the politics of the union in the years which followed. When Ronnie Webb joined P.W.
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Botha's President's Council as a former President of T U C S A , he visited every region consulting with
the workers, but his position soon became untenable. Other executive members could not accept
serving under someone involved in government structures.
The younger element in M I C W U was extremely frustrated with TUCSA's inability
to come to terms with big changes. W e were working in the field with M A W U and
N A A W U - whilst T U C S A was taking an extremely conservative line politically.
Our members were joining N A A W U , seeing our membership of T U C S A as a
rejection of their political aspirations. M I C W U began recruiting Africans in the
1970s, but the option to apply closed shop provisions of the agreement to them
would serve to exclude F O S A T U and force Africans into joining M I C W U , which
would have generated enormous conflict with N A A W U and M A W U . 8 3
M I C W U then took a landmark decision, leaving T U C S A and fighting with the independents for
their inclusion as delegates to the powerful National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel,
Engineering and Metallurgical Sector. This paved the way for the merger of all three into N U M S A
in 1987.
The recognition of African unions was not an inevitable outcome of the Wiehahn
Commission, but the changes in the political orientation of black workers, looking to their unions
to challenge the entire edifice of apartheid, was anyway taking place. The registered unions in
T U C S A which had always claimed to offer 'legal' opposition to apartheid did themselves immense
discredit in the years after 1973, by contributing to state and employer resistance to independent
unionism. TUCSA, itself, after a brief acceleration in recruitment after 1980, could not survive the
wave of attacks upon its affiliates' attempts to corral black membership though closed shop
mechanisms, and it dissolved a year after, the death of its General Secretary Arthur Grobbelaar in
1985 having been unable to find anyone to replace him.
When it became known that the Wiehahn Commission had committed itself to recognition
of black trade unions, Ben Nicholson, General Secretary of the exclusively white Electrical Workers
Association told his members...
...I urge every one of you, especially the youngsters amongst us, to get as many
qualifications as you can. A n employer is not interested in the colour of an
employees skin, but he is interested in the most productive member of the
community. A n d if we as white skilled electricians can prove that we are the best
then we won't be superseded, we will keep the reins in our own hands. What is
our mission? T o control the situation when there are more of them than there are
of u s . "
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Conclusion
The struggle to end white supremacist practices in South African industry had begun in earnest in
1979 with the white unions setting off down a path of fierce rearguard action against the spread of
black workers' influence within the industrial council system. Splits between democratic and
reactionary camps among workers meant that regime opponents had to contend with a degree of
active trade union collaboration with the authoritarian dispensation. In the other examples
examined, the roots of the regime within the working class were weaker than in South Africa.
Nevertheless, the South African regime was willing to overrule the interests of its own supporters
in the labour movement as the pressures for a new dispensation from other quarters were so
intense. This move was facilitated by the fact that the regime had always had an authoritarian stance
towards its own rank and file supporters and had consistently retained freedom of manoeuvre in
relation to them.
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